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David Hume on Banking and Hoarding
Maria Pia Paganelli*
David Hume opposes banks and favors hoarding. The only bank he reluctantly approves of is a
public, 100% reserve bank. Other banks increase money supply and prices, hindering exports
and economic growth. For Hume, a 100% reserve public bank would lead to ‘‘the destruction
of paper-credit’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 285), fostering economic growth instead by preventing
inflation. Additionally, a 100% reserve bank hoards a large quantity of gold and silver, which is
available in case of national emergency.
JEL Classification: B12, B22, E5, E6
1. Introduction
We recently faced a crisis possibly caused, at least in part, by an overgrown banking sector
and overextended bank credit. We heard fears of inflation and liquidity crises and calls for
narrow banking (e.g., Cochrane et al. 2010; Benes and Kumhof 2012). These concerns and
called-for solutions seem to (re)occur when banking systems expand to the point of crisis.
During the Great Depression and its banking crisis, a group of Chicago economists, led by
Henry Simons, prepared a policy proposal to reform the banking system. The so-called 1933
‘‘Chicago Plan’’ proposed the abolition of the fractional reserve system and the imposition of
100% reserve on demand deposit (Phillips 1995). A few years later Irving Fisher also tried to
influence the Roosevelt administration to adopt a 100% reserve system (Allen 1977).
Similarly, during the eighteenth century Scottish banking and credit expansion, David
Hume (1711–1776) suggested reforming the banking system in ways that, with caveats,
adjustments, and appropriate modifications, may sound similar to that suggested in our recent
and less recent past. Hume proposes the abolition of all private banks and, reluctantly, the
establishment of a 100% reserve public bank as possible solutions to overextended credit and
threat of inflation. This article shows how David Hume can be more or less comfortably placed in
the same line as the Chicago Plan and of recent calls for more narrow banking due to his beliefs
that having a 100% reserve banking system would be more beneficial to the economy than a
fractional reserve system, while at the same time maintaining views quite peculiar for a twenty-
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first century observer. Regardless of whether Hume is correct or not in his analysis, what is
relevant here is that the fear of overextended credit seems to lead to calls for very similar action
both today and in the eighteenth century, even though the beliefs about the consequences of the
overextension of credit are quite different. Hume fears that the extension of the banking system
would cause a decrease in precious metals, which could render a country’s military weak. Today
the fears are more linked to the stability of the economy and the banking system. Yet, the
remedies called for in these very similar fears are similar: a 100% reserve banking system.
Hume claims the following about the kind of bank he prefers: ‘‘No bank could be more
advantageous, than such a one as locked up all the money it received, and never augmented the
circulating coin, as is usual, by returning part of its treasure into commerce’’ ([1752] 1985,
pp. 284–5). Hume recognizes that a bank that does not lend cannot stay in business by itself: ‘‘It
would have no profit from its dealing’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 285). Therefore, rather than allowing the
bank to earn a profit by lending out money or by charging fees, Hume suggests a purely
subsidized public bank, where ‘‘the state bore the charges of salaries of the directors and tellers
of this bank’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 285).
Hume suggests the bank of Amsterdam as a successful example of a 100% reserve bank
that should be imitated. He ignores the rumors and doubts about the Bank of Amsterdam’s
practices that were already common in his day (e.g., Smith [1776] 1981, II.ii.104, p. 328 and
IV.iii.b, pp. 479–88). The bank, in fact, virtually admitted insolvency in 1780–1784 and was
then liquidated in 1820 (Quinn and Roberds 2007, 2012).
Hume justifies a 100% reserve public bank with at least three reasons. First, having one
100% reserve public bank would eliminate all other banks. Other banks generate disruption in the
economy ‘‘by increasing money beyond its natural proportion to labour and commodities, and
therefore heightening their prices to the merchants and manufacturers’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 284),
while the reserve public bank would generate ‘‘national advantage, resulting from the low price of
labour’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 285). Second, such a 100% reserve public bank would lead to ‘‘the
destruction of paper-credit’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 285). Third, the reserves of the bank would be ‘‘so
large a sum, lying ready at command, [which] would be a convenience in times of great public
dangers and distress’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 285). I believe this last reason is what characterized Hume’s
understanding of money as incomparable and inapplicable to today’s models and reality but
more appropriate for a distant past (Dillen [1934] 1964; Usher 1943), despite his worries about the
tendencies to over-extend credit in a paper-credit system, which may sound more familiar to us.
This article develops by clarifying each of these three explanations that Hume provides.
The next section considers a possible change of mind that Hume may have had regarding the
role of paper-credit. Section 3 extends Hume’s aversion to private paper-credit to public credit.
Final remarks conclude the article.
2. Banks disrupt the economy ‘‘by increasing money beyond its natural proportion to
labour and commodities, and therefore heightening their prices to the merchants and
manufacturers’’ while this bank would create ‘‘national advantage, resulting from the
low price of labour’’
David Hume is a controversial figure in economics (e.g., Berdell 1995). Some claim he was
a genius and a precursor of our times (e.g., Frenkel and Johnson 1976). Some claim he had
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nothing significant to say, and the little he may have said, he took from others (e.g.,
Schumpeter 1954). Some claim that to understand Hume, we need to model his ideas with our
tools (e.g., Glasner 1985). Some claim that to understand Hume, we need to understand his
whole philosophy (e.g., Dow 2002) or the historical context to which he meant to apply his
analysis (e.g., Caffentzis 2001).
His explicit views on banking are limited to a few paragraphs, but I believe that
understanding Hume’s views on banking requires us to contextualize those paragraphs in both
Hume’s essays and the state of the economic knowledge of his time.
The banks that Hume criticizes are banks that, in their practice, would not accept deposits.
They started to accept deposits only later in the eighteenth century, when the banks were trying
to raise their reserve of gold and silver. Banks would discount merchants’ bills of exchange and
offers merchants’ lines of credit paid out not with gold and silver but by issuing their own notes,
redeemable on demand for gold or silver and guaranteed by the bank’s reserves of precious
metals and the personal wealth of the bankers (Kerr [1884] 1902; Checkland 1975; Munn 1981;
Cowen and Kroszner 1989; White [1994] 1995; Gherity 1995). It is the issuing of these paper
notes that Hume condemns as increasing the money supply. Hume is not explicit about how
else the ideal lending market would work, but from his essay ‘‘On Interest’’ he seems to imply
that loans are an important part of an economy and ought to be given in actual gold and silver
(Hume [1752] 1985, pp. 295–307). Hume therefore can be read as implicitly distinguishing
between money as a means of exchange and money as a part of financial intermediation (for an
explicit distinction see Arnon’s [2011b] claim that we have to wait until David Ricardo’s (1824)
Plan for the Establishment of a National Bank).
Hume condemns banks because banks produce money or ‘‘counterfeit money’’ as he calls
it. I explain why bank money is ‘‘counterfeit’’ later in this article. Here I focus on why regular
banks cause disadvantages for the economy by creating paper money with their loans. For
Hume, banks increase the money supply, and increasing the money supply increases the price
level, including the price of labor. Higher domestic prices, for Hume, make a country less
competitive in international markets. Therefore, the increased prices are detrimental to the
economy. Indeed, Hume tells us ‘‘the dearness of every thing, from plenty of money, is a
disadvantage, which attends an established commerce, and sets bounds to it in every country,
by enabling the poorer states to undersell the richer in all foreign markets’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 284).
Hume’s fear of an increasing money supply, however, seems to be in contradiction with
the rest of his analysis of money. In the rest of the essay ‘‘Of Money’’ and in ‘‘Of the Balance of
Trade,’’ Hume (1752) explains that the quantity of money in an open economy cannot rise
above its natural level, nor can it fall below it, just like ‘‘All water, wherever it communicates,
remains always at a level’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 312). Should the quantity of money increase above
its natural level, domestic prices would increase causing an increase in imports, as foreign goods
are now less expensive. Importing more foreign goods causes an outflow of money, which
would bring the prices back down to their natural level. Therefore, whatever excess supply of
money a country has, the excess will be drained out of the country by foreign trade. Exactly the
same mechanism works in reverse if money is artificially kept below its natural level. In Hume’s
words:
Suppose four-fifths of all the money in GREAT BRITAIN to be annihilated in one night, and
the nation reduced to the same condition, with regard to specie, as in the reigns of the
HARRYS and EDWARDS, what would be the consequence? Must not the price of all labour
and commodities sink in proportion, and every thing be sold as cheap as they were in those
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ages? What nation could then dispute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or
to sell manufacturers at the same price, which to us would afford sufficient profit? In how little
time, therefore, must this bring back the money which we had lost, and raise us to the level of
all the neighbouring nations? Where, after we arrived, we immediately lose the advantage of the
cheapness of labour and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is stopped by our
fullness and repletion. Again, suppose, that all the money of GREAT BRITAIN were
multiplied fivefold in a night, must not the contrary effect follow? Must not all labour and
commodities rise to such an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to
buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, become comparatively so cheap, that,
in spite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us and our money
flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches, which
had laid us under such disadvantages? ([1752] 1985, pp. 311–2)
So it seems that an increase in money is a disadvantage because the country’s higher prices
will make it less competitive in the international markets, and at the same time an increase of
money is irrelevant because the quantity of money will adjust to its natural level.
Some readers see this contradiction, even if presented in different ways, as the difference
between short run and long run (Hegeland 1951; Rotwein 1955; Vickers 1957; cf. Perlman
1987). In the short run money is not neutral, but in the long run money is neutral (Friedman
1987; Lucas 1996). The different way in which short and long run adjustments are often
presented focuses on a different passage in ‘‘Of Money,’’ though, where Hume is allegedly
describing the beneficial effects of an increase in the money supply: ‘‘It is of no manner of
consequence, with regard to the domestic happiness of a state, whether money be in a greater or
less quantity. The good policy of the magistrate consists only in keeping it, if possible, still
encreasing; because, by that means, he keeps alive a spirit of industry in the nation, and
encreases the stock of labour’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 288). Here I follow Paganelli (2006, 2007)
instead, who offers a possible reading that makes Hume more coherent using the differences
between level and flow of money.
In a closed economy, for Hume, the level of money is irrelevant. Indeed ‘‘If we consider
any one kingdom by itself, it is evident, that the greater or less plenty of money is of no
consequence; since the prices of commodities are always proportioned to the plenty of money’’
(Hume [1752] 1985, p. 281), and again ‘‘where coin is in greater plenty; as a greater quantity of
it is required to represent the same quantity of goods; it can have no effect, either good or bad,
taking a nation within itself’’ (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 285).
In an open economy, on the other hand, if the level of money changes for some reason to a
level that is not natural, the quantity of money will adjust to the natural level via the price-
specie-flow mechanism. One cannot force its level to one different from its natural level. The
natural level is the one ‘‘proportionable to the art and industry of each nation’’ (Hume [1752]
1985, p. 312).
A passive change in the money supply, to use an expression of an admirer of Hume, Pietro
Verri ([1771] 1993; see also Cantillion [1730] 2010), is a change in the money supply that does
not reflect a change in the industry of a country, such as the discovery of mines. An active
change is a change due to a change in industry. Now, if one increases the money supply
passively, prices will rise, exports will fall, imports will rise, domestic industry is hurt, and the
extra money flows out, returning to its natural level. The same in reverse is true for a decrease in
the level of the money supply (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 312). Notice, indeed, that when Hume
describes the price-specie flow mechanism, he starts from a change in the level of money, as
cited previously: ‘‘Suppose four-fifths of all the money… to be annihilated…. Again, suppose,
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that all the money…were multiplied fivefold in a night’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 311). Similarly, Hume
claims ‘‘it is certain that, since the discovery of the mines in AMERICA, industry has encreased
in all the nations of EUROPE, except in the possessors of those mines; and this may be justly
ascribed, amongst other reasons, to the encrease of gold and silver’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 286).
On the other hand, changes in the flow of money are indicative of changes in industry,
which ‘‘really arises from the manners and customs of the people’’ (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 290).
If money flows into circulation, it means the domestic industry is active. The reverse is also
true: If money flows out of domestic circulation, it means the domestic industry is shrinking.
Where there is little industry, there is little need for money and, therefore, little money. Where
industry increases, the need for money increases and, therefore, also its presence. ‘‘[A]fter men
begin to refine on all these enjoyments, and live not always at home, nor are content with what
can be raised in their neighbourhood, there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, and
more money enters into that exchange. The tradesmen will not be paid in corn; because they
want something more than barely to eat’’ (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 291). And again ‘‘Men
naturally flock to capital cities, sea-ports, and navigable rivers. There we find more men, more
industry, more commodities, and consequently more money’’ (Hume [1752] 1985, pp. 314–5;
emphasis mine).
Hume continues his explanations claiming that the times of industry are times of low
prices. When industry is lacking, prices will be higher: ‘‘provided the money encreases not in the
nation, every thing must become much cheaper in times of industry and refinement, than in
rude and uncultivated ages’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 291) Industry lowers prices, encouraging foreign
trade by making a country more competitive, which in turn generates the inflow of money that
is symptomatic of the increased industry. Here the lowering of prices is a consequence of the
increased industry, and it is welcomed. Lower prices imply increased export and increased
inflow of money. In the case of an artificial increase in the money supply, prices eventually will
decrease, but in that case the lowering of prices is a consequence of the outflow of money due to
the decrease in industry caused by the lack of competitiveness generated by the artificial
increase in money and prices.
It should now be easier to explain the otherwise contradictory claims that Hume makes. If
the magistrate should increase the level of the money supply to stimulate the economy, how
could we reconcile it with what Hume says about the disadvantages of an increase in prices
(which comes as a consequence of an increase in the level of the money supply) and the
advantages of low prices? If we see that ‘‘keep money still increasing’’ may mean keeping the
inflow of money increasing, then Hume is coherent. A growing economy experiences lower
domestic prices compared to the rest of the world, an increase of exports relative to imports,
and as a consequence an increase in the inflow of money as a payment for the increase in
exports. This is why the keeping of ‘‘money still encreasing’’ may better refer to keep increasing
exports (rather than increasing the money supply), which in turn would generate an increase in
the money supply in terms of inflow of money (Paganelli 2006, 2007).
Understanding how to ‘‘keep money still increasing’’ through keeping industry ‘‘still
increasing’’ makes Hume coherent and extends Hume’s coherence to his analysis of banking.
His aversion to banking works through the analysis of changes in the flow of money and may
be seen as part of a way to short circuit the mechanism of the price-specie flow mechanism to
take advantage of it.
Banks, for Hume, increase the quantity of money in the economy with the introduction of
paper-money. The artificial increase in paper via paper-money keeps ‘‘heightening the prices.’’
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Higher prices cause an increase in imports relative to exports, contract the economy, and lead
to an outflow of specie. Banks, therefore, by increasing the money supply, cause contraction of
the domestic economy. On the other hand, a 100% reserve deposit bank would not increase the
money supply, but by ‘‘lock[ing] up all the money it received, and never augment[ing] the
circulating coin, as is usual, by returning part of its treasure into commerce [… would generate]
the national advantage, resulting from the low price of labour’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 285).
Clifton Luttrell’s (1975) reading of the influence of David Hume on Thomas Jefferson
corroborates the interpretation that I provide here: Jefferson, like Hume, proposes to prohibit the
emission of paper-money by private banks to stabilize domestic prices and determine the
direction of the balance of trade. While for some (e.g., Dorfman 1940; Riggs and Velk 2008) both
Jefferson and Hume lived through some bank and credit turmoil that may explain, in part, their
aversion to paper-credit, others claim that Hume’s Scotland had a relatively stable banking
system (White [1994] 1995). Yet, regardless of the mechanism through what is perceived as a
problem develops, both Jefferson and Hume see the extension of the banking system as a
problem, and the solution that both Jefferson and Hume propose remains quite similar.
3. Such a Bank Would Lead to ‘‘the Destruction of Paper-Credit’’
The Scotland of Hume’s day experienced a boom of banking and credit, as well as a
chronic shortage of specie (Checkland 1975; Munn 1981). Many, including David Hume,
blamed the scarcity of gold and silver on the introduction of banks and their issuing of paper
credit; others, including Adam Smith ([1776] 1981), saw banks and their issuing of paper credit
as an answer to the scarcity of specie (on the differences and similarities between Hume and
Smith, see, among others, Viner [1937], Eagly [1970], and Arnon [2011a]). Hume claims that the
abolition of private banks, and their substitution with a 100% reserve nonlending public bank
of deposit, would have the advantage of destroying paper-credit and bringing back specie. To
understand why the destruction of paper credit is an advantage, we have to understand how
Hume understands money.
Hume tells us that money is ‘‘the instrument they [men] have agreed upon to facilitate the
exchange of a commodity for another’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 281). Money is a universally accepted
means of exchange. Gold and silver, being precious metals, are universally wanted. So money
made of gold and silver is universally accepted, which makes gold and silver (real) money. On
the other hand, paper money, created through credit or loans, is not universally accepted as
money. It is accepted only within a small circle of people, usually physically located around the
issuer of the note: ‘‘Foreigners will not accept of in any payment’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 284). Adam
Smith explains it more clearly: ‘‘[P]aper cannot go abroad; because at a distance from the banks
which issue it, and from the country in which payment of it can be extracted by law, it will not
be received in common payment’’ (Smith [1776] 1981, II.ii.32, p. 294). This is why Hume claims
that paper money is counterfeit money. It is not real money. It is something that may work as
money only in limited places, but it is not universally accepted. One may think (or hope) that
paper money is accepted everywhere as real money. But it is not. So it is a fake, an illusion, ‘‘a
shadow without a substance,’’ as Isaac Gervaise ([1720] 1954, p. 12) would say.
Gold and silver, on the other hand, are precious metals. People want gold and silver for
their nonmonetary uses as well as for their monetary uses. Gold and silver make silverware and
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decoration for houses and churches, as well as jewelry. Their intrinsic values are what allow
them to be universally accepted and, therefore, to be money. Gold and silver are money not
because there is anything special in their nature. They do not have to be money. They happened
to become money—money as a universally accepted medium of exchange. It is not because of
their intrinsic value that they became money but because of their intrinsic value as commodities
that people, by custom, started and continued to accept them as means of payment.
Hume also implies that only gold and silver are to be considered money in at least two
other ways. First, every time he refers to money he refers only to gold and silver coins. When he
refers to paper-money, he explicitly defines it as paper-money, paper-credit, counterfeit money,
and the like. Second, in the 1768 edition of the Essays, Hume adds a paragraph where he claims
that with paper-money one cannot expect the same kind of benefits one has with gold and silver
because paper ‘‘has no intrinsic value’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 637). If money is to be universally
accepted, it has to be accepted within domestic markets, in international transactions, and,
especially, by soldiers. Gold and silver do that. Paper does not. Paper is not accepted in
‘‘foreign wars and negotiations’’ or by foreigners (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 284).
Now, if paper is counterfeit money, what are the consequences of introducing it, besides the
nonacceptance of it in international trade, wars, and negotiations? As if these were not bad
enough, Hume tells us that the introduction of paper will impoverish a country. The introduction
of paper increases the money supply in a country. Following the specie-flow mechanism, an
increase in the money supply will increase prices and therefore decrease the competitiveness of the
country in the international markets. Domestic industry will languish, and precious metals flow
out. Paper-money stays as the only circulating means of exchange, leaving the country with both a
loss of industry and loss of gold and silver. And a decrease in money (gold and silver) is a problem,
as one country does not have anything with which to pay the soldiers hired for its defense.
Therefore, it is true that Hume argues against mercantilism in the sense of criticizing the
claims that the quantity of money in a country could be increased by tariffs and bounties. It is
also true that Hume criticizes mercantilism because of the strict association of precious metals
with wealth. Hume, in fact, claims that tariffs and bounties will be useless instruments in
controlling the quantity of money in a country ([1752] 1985, pp. 308–10). He also claims that
money is not wealth, but rather people and industry are the wealth of a country. Money is
just a reflection of the people and industry of a country. Yet, like mercantilists, he seems
overwhelmingly worried about maintaining a certain quantity of gold and silver in a country,
or, more precisely, about increasing this hoarded quantity.
Banks need to have 100% reserve and not issue paper credit because paper credit will make
gold and silver leave the country. Adam Smith, and some later commentators, offers a mild
accusation of Hume being too close to mercantilism in his views of money. He may indeed have
been, even if with a free trade flavor.
4. ‘‘So large a sum, lying ready at command, would be a convenience in times of great
public dangers and distress’’
The other motivation Hume offers for supporting a public 100% reserve bank is more
alien to a modern mind: the accumulation of stored money the bank would provide. For Hume,
some aspects of a 100% reserve bank seem to work similarly to how a treasury worked in the
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past. Hume’s ideal bank is a sort of hoarding institution because it is a bank that has ‘‘locked
up all the money it received … that so large a sum, lying ready at command, would be a
convenience in times of great public dangers and distress’’ ([1752] 1985, pp. 284–5), that is, in
times of ‘‘wars and negociations with foreign states’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 282). The availability of
precious metals during war emergency is a common reason for hoarding. Cantillion ([1730] 2010)
exemplifies this by claiming: ‘‘Hoarded money, silverware, churches’ money, etc, are resources
that the state turns to in emergency situations’’ (p. 153). Hume’s distinction between a 100%
reserve bank and a hoarding institution does not seem obvious when he comes to this availability
of gold and silver in case of state need. To support a bank that cannot lend to prevent increases in
prices is consistent with Hume’s support of hoarding and other pro-hoarding policy
recommendations that Hume offers to prevent price inflation and to finance wars.
Hume’s fascination with a treasury is present through all his essays. He claims its
superiority to issuing public credit (paper money) in the essay ‘‘Of Public Credit.’’ In ‘‘Of the
Balance of Trade,’’ Hume ([1752] 1985) reiterates the importance of a treasury for the
accumulation gold and silver. He offers many historical examples to show how the presence of
a treasury would take money out of circulation and therefore maintain low prices that stimulate
domestic production and exports and, as a consequence, an inflow of money. This inflow of
money would increase the money in circulation and therefore increase the prices of domestic
goods and eventually decrease exports and increase imports. However, this process can be short
circuited if the inflowing money is not let into circulation. If the money that is flowing in flows
into the treasury, it will not go into circulation, and the prices of domestic goods will be
maintained competitively low. Hume actually tells us that the best way to maintain an inflow of
money is to gather ‘‘large sums into a public treasure, locking them up, and absolutely
preventing their circulation’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 320).
It is true that locking money up in a public treasure may be ‘‘destructive’’ because a large
sum of money in one place attracts enemies and dissipation ([1752] 1985, p. 321).Yet the
advantages of doing it are so much more: locking up money gives a country ‘‘the advantage in
its commerce with the neighbouring kingdoms’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 321). So Hume concludes ‘‘Of
the Balance of Trade’’ with the claim that ‘‘Our modern politics embrace the only method of
banishing money, the using of paper credit; they reject the only method of amassing it, the
practice of hoarding; and they adopt a hundred contrivances, which serve to no purpose but to
check industry, and rob ourselves and our neighbours of the common benefits of art and
nature’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 324). This also means jeopardizing national defense ([1752] 1985, p. 349
and p. 358, among several examples).
The role of hoarding in Hume comes to light even with his claims regarding the ‘‘good
policy of the magistrate.’’ If the ‘‘good policy of the magistrate’’ is to keep low prices so that
exports are encouraged and the flow of precious metal can ‘‘keep increasing,’’ the problem
becomes how to maintain those low prices (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 288). The new money would
increase prices, eating away the competitiveness of low prices, and eventually stopping the
inflow of money. Hume’s bank prevents prices from rising by preventing lending, but this is not
enough. Hume also needs a mechanism to take money out of circulation and therefore maintain
low prices and increase industry through an increase in exports. Hume praises France for
having a ‘‘great plenty of bullion’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 317). The reason he offers is ‘‘the want of
paper-credit. The FRENCH have no banks’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 317). In France, ‘‘many have large
a sum of money in their coffers; Great quantities of plate are used in private houses; and all the
churches are full of it’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 317). Hume offers here the same justification as he does
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for the proposal of a 100% reserve bank: ‘‘[T]he provision of labour remains cheaper among
them, than in nations that are not half so rich in gold and silver. The advantages of this
situation, in point of trade as well as in great public emergencies, are too evident to be disputed’’
([1752] 1985, p. 317; emphasis mine).
The other policy recommendation Hume praises is one from Genoa. When in Genoa it
became fashionable to use services of chinaware rather than of silver or gold plate, that is, when
it became fashionable to have serving utensils made of porcelain rather than of precious metals,
‘‘the senate, foreseeing the consequences, prohibited the use of that brittle commodity beyond a
certain extent; while the use of silver-plate was left unlimited. And I suppose, in their late
distresses, they felt the good effect of this ordinance’’ (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 318; emphasis mine).
Using silver or gold for silverware and serving utensils is like locking it up. Silverware absorbs
the incoming flow of money, preventing prices from rising (Paganelli 2007). Gold and silver
serving utensils store the precious metals and can be easily melted into coins. Having silver
vases to melt into coins is a device to fight liquidity emergencies for individuals and to pay taxes
eventually used to buy soldiers in case of need, just like in the case of a 100% reserve bank.
A 100% reserve bank, a complete absence of banks, and a partial ban on the use of
porcelain all prevent price inflation (the latter two actually favor price deflation), but all,
according to Hume, facilitate the accumulation of gold and silver. The presence of large sums
of money is seen as positive because it can be released in times of need, meaning it can
eventually be used to pay for troops in case of war.
Therefore, a 100% reserve bank does not increase the money supply, causing
disadvantages in an economy; it helps maintain low prices, which cause advantages in
international trade and therefore for the domestic economy. It eliminates the presence of paper
credit and, proving to be a sort of avenue for hoarding, it accumulates a large quantity of
precious metals, which can be used in emergencies. Hume also recognizes that a 100% reserve
public bank makes trade more convenient because the paper note given as a receipt of deposit is
more easily transportable and safer that the actual gold and silver. This is the reason why Hume
suggests this kind of bank as opposed to none.
5. Change of Mind?
Could we claim that Hume is not that much against banks and credit because he changes his
mind, as testified by his adding a new paragraph in the 1764 edition (Hume [1764] 1985, p. 637)?
The added paragraph opens by claiming how difficult understanding money is. Hume then seems to
show some favor of paper credit and banks because he sees their advantages ‘‘to be superior to their
disadvantages. That they banish specie and bullion from a state is undoubtedly true; and whoever
looks no farther than this circumstance does well to condemn them; but specie and bullion are not
of so great consequence as not to admit of a compensation, and even an overbalance from the
encrease of industry and of credit, which may be promoted by the right use of paper-money’’ ([1752]
1985, p. 318). Hume then goes on, describing ‘‘one of the most ingenious ideas that has been
executed in commerce’’ (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 319): bank-credit. Bank credit is ‘‘equivalent to ready
money, a merchant hereby in a manner coin his houses, his household furniture, the goods in his
warehouse, the foreign debts due to him, his ships at sea; and can, upon occasion, employ them in
all payments, as if they were the current money of the country’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 319).
976 Paganelli
I am not convinced this claim represents a change of mind and an endorsement of banking
and credit (cf. Arnon 2011a). The following paragraph was also added to the same edition. In
this added paragraph, Hume continues his rant against the loss of precious metal, which is so
deleterious for a country. Hume claims, ‘‘But however other advantages result from these
inventions, it must still be allowed that, beside[s] giving too great facility to credit, which is
dangerous, they banish the precious metals’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 320).
These two new paragraphs may also be interpreted in the following way. Hume always
presents both sides of the argument. He then proceeds to either demolish the argument against
his or claims that the other face of the coin is not as good as the one he favors. In his essay ‘‘Of
Public Credit,’’ this is quite explicit both in the final edition of the essay and previous versions.
From 1752 to 1768, Hume declared, ‘‘[W]hat human evil is there, which is not attended with
some advantages? This we shall endeavour to explain, that we may estimate the weight which
we ought to allow it’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 637).
Furthermore, these two new paragraphs are mounted between two statements regarding
the negative effects of banking and paper money, as they cause the outflow of money (gold and
silver). This is directly before the two new paragraphs: ‘‘What a pity LYCURGUS did not
think of paper-credit when he wanted to banish gold and silver from SPARTA! It would have
served his purpose better than the lumps of iron he made use of as money; and would also have
prevented more effectually all commerce with strangers, as being of so much less real and
intrinsic value’’ (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 318). And this is what follows the two new paragraphs:
‘‘[O]ur projects of paper-credit are almost the only expedient, by which we can sink money
below its level’’ (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 320).
When reading the essay both in its entirety and as part of a group of other essays, one
might interpret these two new paragraphs as Hume simply presenting costs and benefits of
paper-credit, only to then conclude that the benefits do not outweigh the costs of the loss of
hoarded gold and silver.
6. The New Paradox
Hume’s aversion to bank lending extends to bank lending to the government. In Scotland
the problem was not as severe since the charter of the Bank of Scotland included a clause
prohibiting the Bank from lending to the government. But for the Bank of England it was
different (Checkland 1975).
Hume sees the problems of debt financing and increasing the money supply with easy
credit, especially to the government: ‘‘[O]ur national debts furnish merchants with a species of
money’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 353). To speak about fiscal or monetary policy in the eighteenth
century is premature, given that such policies did not openly exist yet. Still, there was talk about
how to stimulate an economy. And an increase in paper money, generally through easy credit,
was commonly believed by some of his contemporaries, such as Sir Robert Walpole (see also,
e.g., Dutot [1738] 1974; Wallace [1758] 1969; de Pinto [1774] 1969), to be a possible way to
achieve this. Hume, on the other hand, does not believe one can stimulate the economy with an
increase in paper money (Paganelli 2009).
Hume tells us that in his day, people were experiencing a paradoxical situation: They want
to increase debt without any necessity to do so. That is, they want to increase the money supply
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via paper money because they think, incorrectly, or better, ridiculously, according to Hume,
that increasing the money supply would bring along beneficial stimuli. Politicians will brag
about the benefits they have generated without having imposed any direct cost to the current
citizens. These are Hume’s words describing the ‘‘folly’’ of these ‘‘absurd’’ claims:
It is very tempting to a minister to employ such an expedient, as enables him to make a great
figure during his administration, without overburthening the people with taxes, or exciting any
immediate clamours against himself. … What then shall we say to the new paradox, that public
incumbrances, are, of themselves, advantageous, independent of the necessity of contracting
them; and that any state, even though it were not pressed by a foreign enemy, could not
possibly have embraced a wiser expedient for promoting commerce and riches, than to create
funds, debts, and taxes without limitation? Reasonings such as these, might naturally have
passed for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on folly or fever, on BUSIRIS
and NERO, had we not seen such absurd maxims patronized by great ministers, and by a whole
party among us.’’ ([1752] 1985, p. 352)
The reason why the idea of stimulating the economy by increasing the money supply via public
credit sounds like a trial of wit is, I believe, twofold. First, because of the price-specie-flow mechanism,
any attempt to artificially increase the money supply would lead to a decrease of domestic industry.
Second, debt financing is a sure road to abuse: ‘‘The practice, therefore, of contracting debt will
almost infallibly be abused, in every government. It would scarcely be more imprudent to give a
prodigal son a credit in every banker’s shop in London, than to impower a statesman to draw bills, in
this manner, upon posterity’’ (Hume [1752] 1985, p. 352; see also, Paganelli 2012).
While Hume’s inflationary worries sound modern, we must not forget that his most
pressing preoccupation about price inflation was the outflow of precious metals, which would
make a country unstable and indefensible in case of war. My interpretation here differs from
Istvan Hont’s (1993), who suggests that for Hume wars are the main cause of public debt, and
the coming and maintenance of peace would eliminate the need of public credit. But even
accepting that ‘‘Britain’s quest for [military] glory had to be denounced ‘as the source of all
dangers’’’ (Hont 1993, p. 336), Hume’s preoccupations regarding paper-money remain.
7. Conclusion
David Hume’s aversion to banking, reluctant acceptance of a 100% reserve public bank,
and espousing of hoarding may be interpreted as parts of his vision of money being only gold
and silver and being indispensable for economic stability and national security. Banks produce
counterfeit money, which generates price inflation and decreases the competitiveness of a
country in its international trade, therefore damaging the domestic economy. The outflow of
gold and silver due to the introduction of paper money is also seen as a threat to national
security as a country without precious metals would not be easily able to pay its troops. Only
the abolition of private banks, the presence of one 100% reserve public bank, and various
hoarding mechanisms would, according to Hume, allow an economy to flourish and to be safe.
Hume’s fears of the excessively increased money supply and overextended credit and some
of his possible solutions may be read, with caveats of course, as some of the fears we may face
today.
Fears of the possible danger and abuses of overextending credit seem to be present when
credit quickly expands. They were present during the time of credit expansion in Scotland in the
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eighteenth century, during the Great Depression, and during the banking crisis of our recent
past.
The proposals for reform of the banking systems are strikingly similar if adjusted to the
different institutional context: David Hume seems particularly conscious of the dangers of
credit, both private and public, and he does not sound far from the Chicago Plan group
(Phillips 1995), which proposes versions of a 100% banking system (e.g., Fisher 1945; Simons
1946; Friedman 1959, 1967), or to current advocates of higher capital requirements as a
possible remedy against future financial crises. Hume seems, therefore, to fit in the large
family of economists that proposed the Chicago Plan in the 1930s and narrower banking
today.
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